

National Identity After Conquest

Christopher Carter*
University of Virginia

Daniel Gingerich†
University of Virginia

March 18, 2024

Abstract

Conquering powers routinely adopt state-directed nationalization projects that seek to make the boundaries of the nation coterminous with the (newly expanded) boundaries of the state. To this end, they implement policies that elevate the economic status of individuals who embrace the national identity of the conquering power and discriminate against those who do not. This article develops a formal model that illuminates when such policies succeed or fail. We show that the effectiveness of discrimination hinges on the perceived longevity of rule by the conquering power. If the popular perception is that such rule will be short-lived, then discrimination will backfire, as dissident parents exert greater effort to transmit the marginalized national identity to their children. This intense intergenerational socialization more than compensates for the negative wealth effects of discrimination. If, on the other hand, rule under the conquering power is perceived to be long-lasting, then discrimination will achieve the aims for which it is intended. Case studies on the Chilean occupation of Tacna, Perú (1880-1929) and the Prussian occupation of the Danish-German border region of Schleswig-Holstein (1866-1920) illustrate the logic of the model.

Keywords: Cultural change, national identity, conquest, foreign occupation, formal theory, socialization

*Department of Politics, University of Virginia. christopher.carter@virginia.edu.

†Department of Politics, University of Virginia. dwg4c@virginia.edu.

1 Introduction

What explains the malleability or recalcitrance of national identities in the wake of foreign conquest? Conquering powers routinely adopt state-directed nationalization projects, or government-led efforts to make the boundaries of the nation coterminous with the (newly expanded) boundaries of the state. To this end, they implement policies that elevate the economic status of individuals who embrace the national identity of the conquering power and discriminate against those who do not. While such policies have a transparent logic, they can backfire—generating a stronger identification with the nationality of the conquered territory.¹ At the same time, there are numerous instances where state-directed nationalization efforts ultimately prevailed, despite lags or varying degrees of initial resistance.²

To address why, we develop a novel formal model that illuminates when state-directed nationalization policies succeed or fail. Drawing on the economics of cultural change, our model illuminates the consequences of economic discrimination for the long-run evolution of national identities. Our central insight is that the effectiveness of state-directed nationalization hinges on the perceived longevity of rule by the conquering power. Economic discrimination is implemented by conquering powers because they seek to make the adopters of a conquering state’s national identity into exemplars of prosperity and upward economic mobility. They hope that younger generations—seeing the pecuniary returns to accommodation all around them in the larger society—will naturally gravitate towards the national identity of the conquering power.

Yet, the adoption of national identity is not solely a function of wealth-driven societal influence—it is also a function of the values parents bequeath to children via household socialization. Herein lies the rub. If parents perceive that rule by the conquering power will be short-lived, then economic discrimination will backfire, as dissident parents exert greater effort to transmit the marginalized national identity to their children within the home. This intense intergenerational socialization may more than compensate for the

¹Examples of such failures include Japanization measures instituted during the Empire of Japan’s colonization of Korea (1910-1945), the English’s Crown’s attempts to Anglicise Ireland following reconquest by the Tudor Dynasty (1534–1603), the Nueva Planta decrees imposed on Catalonia by the Bourbon monarchy in Castile after the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714), and—arguably—the Americanization of Puerto Rico after the Spanish-American War (1898).

²The assimilation of Mexican nationals in the US Southwest following the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) is one such example, as is assimilation by native Hawaiians following US annexation (1898), the gradual transformation of Welsh identity into English identity following conquest by Edward I (1283), the evolution of Bretons into Frenchmen after the French-Breton War (1487-1491), and the adoption of French identity by ethnic Germans in Alsace after Germany’s defeat in WWI (1918).

negative wealth effects of discrimination. If, on the other hand, rule under the conquering power is perceived to be long-lasting, then discrimination will achieve the aims for which it is intended.

These dynamics have clear implications for the effectiveness of state-directed nationalization policies, which depend on the context in which conquest and subsequent occupation occur. Simply put, halfway measures are destined to fail. For a conquering power to successfully use economic discrimination to prod members of a marginalized national identity to adopt the conqueror’s national identity, all hope of reversion to the pre-conquest political order must be eliminated. In practice, this means that state-directed nationalization is unlikely to work in settings where there is ongoing warfare that could potentially restructure interstate boundaries (yet again), local customs and elites have been preserved through a system of indirect rule, or the denizens of the occupied territory are told they may at some point determine their fate through a sovereignty referendum. For state-directed nationalization policies to meet with success, the conquests upon which they are built must be fully consummated, stable, and not subject to revision in the foreseeable future.

We develop our intuitions on this point by adopting and modifying Bisin and Verdier’s (2001) model of cultural transmission across generations, which itself draws upon mathematical frameworks of cultural evolution developed in Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985). Variants of this model have been employed to study the evolution of preferences for democracy (Besley and Persson 2019; Ticchi, Verdier and Vindigni 2013), civic culture (Persson and Tabellini 2021), and religion (Bisin, Carvalho and Verdier 2023).³ The critical feature of the model for our purposes is the representation of cultural evolution as a process that takes place via two distinct transmission mechanisms: oblique transmission, which refers to broad societal influences on the values acquired by individuals, and vertical transmission, which refers to the influence of parents on the same.

The imposition of discriminatory policies during state-led nationalization efforts is an attempt to tip the societal balance in favor of the national identity of individuals aligned with the conquering power. However, parental efforts at identity transmission may produce reactions to discrimination that push in the opposite direction. Such will be the case when the solidity of the conquest is in doubt. If the anticipated time horizon of rule by the conquering power is short, then the beneficiaries of discrimination today will likely become its victims tomorrow. To the extent that parents care about the future economic prospects of their children, this means that individuals belonging to the marginalized

³Broad overviews of contemporary approaches to cultural transmission are provided in Bisin and Verdier (2023) and Nunn (2021).

nationality will be strongly motivated to bequeath their identity, whereas those holding the official nationality will not. Vertical transmission of identity in the home thus produces a backfire effect that favors the growth of the marginalized national identity.

By the same calculus, however, discrimination will be a remarkably effective tool of national homogenization in contexts where the solidity of conquest is unquestioned. In such instances, discrimination favoring the official nationality will generate assimilationist pressures both within society at large and within the home. With respect to parental calculations, individuals holding the marginalized nationality will not want to bequeath an identity that unambiguously sabotages their children’s future economic prospects. At the same time, individuals holding the official nationality will strongly desire to bequeath their identity due to the relatively certain economic benefits that it brings. Given the combination of wealth effects and vertical transmission that both point in the same direction, discrimination under an iron-clad conquest will favor the rapid growth of the official nationality.

We examine these predictions in two nineteenth-century borderlands: Tacna and Northern Schleswig. In the aftermath of intense and protracted wars, Tacna, historically a Peruvian department, fell into Chilean hands, while Northern Schleswig, long part of Denmark, came under Prussian control. The treaties that settled the respective conflicts each promised a plebiscite to decide the fate of the territories: whether they would remain under occupier control or revert to their former countries. In Northern Schleswig, the prospect of a plebiscite was quickly dismissed, solidifying perceptions in the region that Prussian rule would be enduring. We demonstrate that, in response, many former Danes abandoned this identity and instead embraced Germany’s assimilationist efforts. In Tacna, on the other hand, there was a credible commitment to a plebiscite for the entire forty-five years of Chilean rule; the prospect of a return to Peru was perceived to be not only possible but likely. As a result, Chile’s assimilationist efforts were generally resisted, and a Peruvian identity persisted. In addition to these two primary cases, we examine evidence from two other contested nineteenth-century territories occupied by Chile: Antofagasta, a formerly Bolivian territory, and Tarapacá, a historically Peruvian territory.

Existing theories of cultural evolution examine resistance to assimilation projects in the contexts of salient ethnolinguistic or ethnonationalist cleavages (e.g., Fouka 2020; Laitin 2007). The refusal to assimilate can thus be linked to a desire to preserve an identity that is inherently valuable and distinct from the one being imposed by a dominant group. Our model and evidence, in contrast, highlight how resistance to assimilation may occur even when ethnic boundaries and identities are less sharply defined. Marginalized groups may incur a cost of maintaining and transmitting otherwise non-salient identities, when

they believe that their identity group will imminently regain power. For example, during the Chilean occupation of Tacna, Peru, the divisions between Chileans and Peruvians were not sharply delineated; the two groups shared a common language, and neither had a particularly well-defined national identity at the end of the nineteenth century. Yet, Peruvians maintained a distinctly Peruvian identity even in the face of Chile’s nationalization project precisely because, as we argue below, institutional arrangements signaled to Peruvians that occupation would likely be short-lived.

A note about scope conditions. The analytical purchase of our model will be greatest in contexts where underlying conceptions of national identity are sufficiently flexible that a community that identifies with a marginalized nationality can realistically switch to the official nationality over time. The dynamics of state-directed nationalization we investigate are particularly salient in the aftermath of wars and territorial disputes in historical borderlands, frontier zones that contain multicultural populations with varying links and levels of allegiance to the contending states that claim them (Wilson and Donnan 1998; Readman, Radding and Bryant 2014).⁴

2 Nationalism in the Shadow of Conflict and Discrimination

Our framework is inspired by and seeks to enrich three distinct literatures in political science. The first is the voluminous scholarship on nationalism and nation-building.⁵ Recent work on this topic has emphasized, as we do here, that processes of state-led nationalization are closely linked to the external and internal security environment. For instance, the expansion of mass education, commonly a vehicle for promoting a homogenous national identity, has been claimed to result from interstate military competition (Aghion et al. 2019; Darden and Mylonas 2016) as well as domestic civil conflict (Paglayan 2022, cf. Ansell and Lindvall 2013).⁶ While elucidating the factors that affect elites’ incentives to pursue state-led nationalization policies, however, these works take the success of such

⁴Our model does not extend to contexts in which a conquering power adheres to a primarily primordial or race-based view of national identity and the characteristics of subjugated population are believed to be incompatible with membership in the nation of said power. In such scenarios, state-directed nationalization—as understood here—cannot take place. Instead, creating an isomorphism between the boundaries of the nation and the state is likely to involve other processes—genocide, mass expulsions, or forced miscegenation—that are outside the scope of our framework.

⁵For relevant reviews of the literature, see Kalin and Sambanis (2018) and Mylonas and Tudor (2021).

⁶The specific types of homogenizing policies states adopt vis-à-vis marginalized identity groups has similarly been attributed to external security concerns (Mylonas 2013).

policies as a given. Consequently, they do not address if and when state-led nationalization will be effective in encouraging recalcitrant groups to change their national allegiances.⁷

Other studies linking nationalism to the security environment concentrate on the dynamics of war itself, with particular emphasis on how wartime and post-war loyalties are shaped by territorial control and past victimization (Balcells 2012; De Juan et al. 2024; Kalyvas 2008). While our framework similarly stresses the solidity of territorial control, we explicate its relevance for a different outcome and setting: the long-run composition of national identities once territorial conquest has been consummated. This distinctive focus lends itself to an analytical approach based on inter-generational values transmission rather than short-term calculations, with different implications about the process by which identities are sustained or abandoned.

Relatedly, international relations scholars have analyzed nationalism as a force that shapes the returns to conquest and therefore the prospects for war (Gilpin 1981; Liberman 1998; Rosecrance 1986). Indeed, it has been shown that nation-state creation and nationalist attitudes are frequently accompanied by inter-state war (Gruffydd-Jones 2017; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Schrock-Jacobson 2012; Snyder 2000; Wimmer 2013), a fact attributable to attempts to align national and state boundaries. Our analysis offers a critical addendum to such scholarship in that it elucidates when attempts to expand nations by extending state borders fail.

Our framework also speaks directly to the literature on the legacies of occupation after conquest in war. Studies in this vein find that external rule often backfires on the occupying power, leading to turmoil in the occupied polity and strained relations between the two states if and when occupation ends (Downes 2021; Edelstein 2011; Aaskoven 2022). While sharing our concern with the unintended consequences of external rule, this work concentrates primarily on whether occupation furthers the security goals of the occupying state. As such, it stops short of considering how the policies of occupiers do or do not shape the formation of national identities. Moreover, it depicts the difference between occupation and annexation as stark and readily apparent, when, in fact, the eventual denouement of territorial conquest is often shrouded in uncertainty for affected populations.⁸ This is of critical importance, as perceptions about the duration of occupation play a central role in our analysis.

⁷Sambanis, Skaperdas and Wohlforth (2015) offer a model of endogenous national identity, but their focus is on national status (war-making capacity) as opposed to group-targeted discrimination.

⁸On this point, Kocher, Lawrence and Monteiro (2018) describe how expectations of Germany's future military dominance shaped patterns of collaboration among the right in Nazi-occupied France. Similarly, Knuppe (2023) notes that resistance to the occupation of the Islamic State in Northern Iraq intensified as the prospects for its continued rule diminished.

Perhaps most closely related to our framework is the scholarship on the evolution of identity in states that officially endorse discrimination in favor of a specific national identity. Brubaker (1995) refers to such entities as “nationalizing states,” defined by the fact that they promote “the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, or political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation” (109). Whether discrimination furthers the goals of such states is an open question. Studies of official discrimination in settings of colonial rule and/or ethnically divided states note that the resulting inequities may fuel the fires of ethno-nationalist mobilization against the central government (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010; Lawrence 2013). On the other hand, investigations that examine national identity as the result of strategic choices about language repertoires emphasize that official discrimination can be highly effective in promoting adoption of the favored national identity. For instance, Laitin (1998, 2007) describes how labor market discrimination may lead to rapid assimilation, as parents holding the marginalized identity seek to harness the economic advantages of having their children acquire the official language. Yet, this analysis fails to appreciate that identity formation is a two-sided process, structured by the costly transmission of values and skills by parents holding *both* the marginalized and official identity. For this reason, it misses the empirically well-documented phenomenon of language policy backlash (Fouka 2020).⁹ In contrast, the two-sided nature of identity formation is explicitly incorporated into the core structure of our analytical framework, providing us with the ability to describe how the specific features of occupation and discrimination combine to shape the evolution of national identities.

3 A Model of Cultural Evolution Under External Rule

3.1 Framework

Consider a polity under external intervention after conquest. The society is composed of individuals belonging to one of two groups, conformists and dissidents, with group membership denoted by $g \in \{c, d\}$. Conformists ($g = c$) have values that are compatible with the externally imposed regime and are favored by it, whereas dissidents ($g = d$) have values that are in conflict with the regime and are disfavored by it. One can conceptualize conformists as former irredentists in a recently conquered territory now living under the ethnically compatible state, or citizens of the conquering state that have been transplanted to the conquered territory. Dissidents are the mirror image: loyalists

⁹See Laitin (1995), Bisin et al. (2011), and (Fouka 2020, Supplementary Appendix) for models of the persistence of marginalized identities under discrimination. Our framework is closest in spirit to the latter studies, particularly in terms of the emphasis on the possibility of backfire effects.

to the conquered state living under foreign rule. The initial tendencies of conformists and dissidents notwithstanding, members of each group select their investments in skills and the values they bequeath to their descendants, thereby determining the relative size of the two groups in the long run.

The lifespan of all individuals within the polity lasts a single period, with a generic period denoted by t . At the conclusion of each period, each individual produces a single descendent, thereby replenishing the population. We refer to the former as parents and the latter as children. During their lifespans, parents within each group are tasked with making two decisions. First, they must determine the types of skills they will adopt, factoring in the costs of skill formation given the incentive structures imposed by the occupying power. Second, they must choose how much effort to allocate in bequeathing their values to their children, recognizing that their children's well-being will depend on the compatibility between the values they inherit and the institutional realities they face. The aggregate choices over skills and values made by parents in the two groups in a given period determine the relative sizes of the groups in the subsequent period. Given this intergenerational linkage, the long-run cultural legacy of occupation can be characterized as a function of aspects of the political environment that shape parents' choices.

We model skill formation and parental socialization as oblique (society-based) and vertical (household-based) forms of cultural transmission, respectively. Let the proportion of the polity composed of dissidents in period t be denoted by p_t . The proportion of dissidents in the subsequent period is written:

$$p_{t+1} = p_t [\delta_d + (1 - \delta_d)\phi] + (1 - p_t)(1 - \delta_c)\phi. \quad (1)$$

The expression contained within square brackets represents the probability that a dissident parent has a dissident child. The first component of this expression is the probability that a dissident parent is successful in bequeathing her values to her child, δ_d . This represents an instance of successful vertical transmission. The second component of the expression is the probability that a dissident parent fails to bequeath her values to her child ($1 - \delta_d$), but the child nevertheless adopts a dissident cultural perspective due to societal influence (ϕ). This is oblique transmission. The remaining component of the expression captures the probability that a conformist parent has a dissident child. This occurs when a conformist parent is unable to bequeath her values to her child ($1 - \delta_c$) and societal influence leads the child to embrace a dissident perspective (ϕ).

3.2 Societal Influence

Both societal influence and within-household values transmission are endogenous to the actions of parents. Societal transmission can be thought of as reflecting the relative social standing of the two groups, with such influence tilted in favor of the group with greater average wealth. This wealth advantage may be due to younger generations choosing to emulate economically successful cultural traits or because wealthier groups have an edge in publicly advocating for their values. The link between group wealth and societal influence can be expressed as follows:

$$\phi = \left[\frac{1}{2} + \beta(\bar{W}_d - \bar{W}_c) \right]^{[0,1]}, \quad (2)$$

where \bar{W}_g is the average wealth of group g , $\beta > 0$ reflects the importance accorded to material differences within the society, and $[x]^{[0,1]}$ denotes that expression x is bounded between 0 and 1. Note that when the wealth of the two groups is equal, the expression above is simply $\phi = \frac{1}{2}$.

Each parent's wealth is a function of investments in skills, pre-existing endowments that shape skill premia, and group-specific costs to skills acquisition imposed by the occupying power. Let $i \in g$ denote an individual belonging to group g , with $W_{i,t}$ and $s_{i,t}$ denoting i 's wealth and skills investment in period t , respectively. The relationship between wealth and skills investment is

$$W_{i,t} = s_{i,t}\gamma_i - \frac{s_{i,t}^2}{2} \left[\mathcal{I}(i \in d) + (1 - \mathcal{I}(i \in d))\frac{1}{\tau} \right], \quad (3)$$

where γ_i is individual i 's skill premium, $\mathcal{I}(\cdot)$ is an indicator function equal to 1 if its argument is true (0 otherwise), and $\tau > 1$ is a formal skills acquisition penalty levied by the occupying power against the dissident group. In this formulation, τ parameterizes the relative costs of higher skills investment across the two groups, with higher values of the parameter denoting greater costs for dissidents relative to conformists. In an educational setting, high τ can be envisioned as discrimination against dissidents in schooling, in that achieving a given level of human capital demands more from a dissident than a conformist. To keep the exposition focused, skill premia for members of each group are assumed to be distributed in the same manner, following a distribution function \mathcal{F} with support \mathbb{R}^+ , expected value μ and variance σ .

Each parent selects the level of investment in skills that maximizes (3), which is equal to $s_{i,t}^* = s_i^* = \gamma_i$ for $i \in d$ and $s_{i,t}^* = s_i^* = \gamma_i\tau$ for $i \in c$. Average levels of wealth in the two groups, in turn, are:

$$\bar{W}_d = \frac{\mu^2 + \sigma^2}{2}, \bar{W}_c = \frac{\tau(\mu^2 + \sigma^2)}{2}. \quad (4)$$

Plugging these quantities into (2), one can readily verify that the likelihood of societal influence leading to a child acquiring a dissident perspective is decreasing in τ :

$$\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial \tau} = \frac{-\beta(\mu^2 + \sigma^2)}{2} < 0. \quad (5)$$

3.3 Regime Change

The above indicates that differences in wealth between the two groups are a function of discriminatory policies imposed by the conquering state. Should that state be forced to abandon the conquered territory, then patterns of discrimination will likely be reversed: conformists under the current regime will be classified as dissidents under the new regime and vice-versa. To capture this insight, we assume symmetry in discrimination across state-led nationalization regimes. Should the conquering state be ejected in the future, the average wealth of (today's) conformists will be equal to the average wealth of (today's) dissidents. Similarly, the average wealth of (today's) dissidents will be equal to the average wealth of (today's) conformists. Let \bar{W}'_d and \bar{W}'_c denote the average wealth of (today's) dissidents and conformists, respectively, under a new regime led by the state representing the marginalized nationality. Symmetry in discrimination implies $\bar{W}'_d = \bar{W}_c$ and $\bar{W}'_c = \bar{W}_d$.

This modeling assumption in essence formalizes a legacy of grievance, in that nationality groups, when given the chance, impose discrimination to the same degree as they received it. As we discuss below, given the existence of altruistic parents, it also suggests that imposing discrimination is a potentially risky policy for nationalizing states unless those in the territory are certain of the occupier's hold on power.

3.4 Socialization within the Household

The final decision taken by parents during their lifespans concerns the effort they will expend in socializing their children to retain the values they hold. This can be modeled as parental investment in the transmission of values within the household (Bisin and Verdier 2001). Taking the realities of the labor market and, *ipso facto*, the nature of societal influence under the occupying power as given, parents are tasked with determining the likelihood that household socialization will permit them to bequeath their values to their children.

Let U^{dd} and U^{dc} denote the utility that a dissident parent receives from having a dissident and conformist child, respectively. Similarly, let U^{cc} and U^{cd} denote the utility that a conformist parent receives from having a conformist and dissident child, respectively. The relevant expressions for dissident parents are:

$$U^{dd} = \eta_d + a\bar{W}_d + (1-a)\bar{W}'_d \quad (6)$$

$$U^{dc} = a\bar{W}_c + (1-a)\bar{W}'_c \quad (7)$$

where $\eta_d > 0$ reflects the intrinsic value dissident parents place on bequeathing their national identity to their children and $a \in [0, 1]$ is the probability that the conquering power is ejected prior to or during their child's lifetime.

For conformist parents, we have:

$$U^{cc} = \eta_c + a\bar{W}_c + (1-a)\bar{W}'_c \quad (8)$$

$$U^{cd} = a\bar{W}_d + (1-a)\bar{W}'_d \quad (9)$$

where $\eta_c > 0$ reflects the intrinsic value conformist parents place on bequeathing their national identity to their children.

According to the above expressions, parents are both cultural egoists and economic altruists vis-à-vis their children. They are cultural egoists in the sense that, all else equal, they derive pleasure from having their children maintain the same sense of national identity that they themselves hold. They are economic altruists in the sense that they care about the future economic well-being of their children. Such economic well-being is represented by their child's expected wealth, which is a function of their child's national identity and the regime in power.¹⁰ The fact that a child's future economic well-being hinges on the match between national identity and the state in control of the conquered territory means that economically altruistic parents will make socialization decisions based in part on assessments of the geo-strategic environment.

The choice problem faced by a dissident parent can be expressed as follows (individual and period subscripts are omitted since each group member faces the same problem every period):

$$\max_{\delta_d \in [0,1]} [\delta_d + (1-\delta_d)\phi] U^{dd} + (1-\delta_d)(1-\phi)U^{dc} - \frac{\delta_d^2}{2}, \quad (10)$$

¹⁰We presume that when a parent makes decisions about socialization in the household, she is not yet privy to her child's individual skill premium. Thus, expected wealth is solely a function of a child's national identity and the discrimination regime.

where $\delta_d^2/2$ represents the (increasing and convex) cost of instilling one's values in children. This results in the optimally selected level of parental investment in transmitting the dissident national identity:

$$\delta_d^* = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } a > \bar{a}_d \\ (1 - \phi) [\eta_d + \Delta(1 - 2a)] & \text{if } a \in (\underline{a}_d, \bar{a}_d) \\ 1 & \text{if } a < \underline{a}_d, \end{cases} \quad (11)$$

where:

$$\bar{a}_d \equiv \frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \frac{\eta_d}{\Delta} \right) \quad (12)$$

$$\underline{a}_d \equiv \frac{1}{2} \left[1 - \frac{1}{\Delta} \left(\frac{1}{1 - \phi} - \eta_d \right) \right] \quad (13)$$

$$\Delta \equiv \frac{(\tau - 1)(\mu^2 + \sigma^2)}{2}. \quad (14)$$

The equivalent problem faced by a conformist parent is:

$$\max_{\delta_c \in [0,1]} [\delta_c + (1 - \delta_c)(1 - \phi)] U^{cc} + (1 - \delta_c)\phi U^{cd} - \frac{\delta_c^2}{2}, \quad (15)$$

which results in the optimally selected level of parental investment in transmitting the conformist national identity:

$$\delta_c^* = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } a < \underline{a}_c \\ \phi [\eta_c - \Delta(1 - 2a)] & \text{if } a \in (\underline{a}_c, \bar{a}_c) \\ 1 & \text{if } a > \bar{a}_c, \end{cases} \quad (16)$$

where:

$$\underline{a}_c \equiv \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{\eta_c}{\Delta} \right) \quad (17)$$

$$\bar{a}_c \equiv \frac{1}{2} \left[1 + \frac{1}{\Delta} \left(\frac{1}{\phi} - \eta_c \right) \right]. \quad (18)$$

In the expressions above, Δ reflects the difference in wealth a child can expect to receive if she belongs to the ruling nationality instead of the marginalized one. If the perceived longevity of the occupation is high ($a \gg 1/2$) and Δ is large relative to η_d , then dissident parents will not invest in transmitting their national identity to their children. Similarly, if the perceived longevity of the occupation is low ($a \ll 1/2$) and Δ is large relative to η_c , then conformist parents will not invest in transmitting their national identity

to their children. In both cases, this is because transmitting the parental national identity generates expected economic costs for children that are simply too great to bear relative to the cultural benefits enjoyed by parents. If, on the other hand, the perceived longevity of the occupation is at a moderate level or the cultural benefits enjoyed by parents are not too small relative to economic considerations, then both dissident and conformist parents will invest in transmitting their identities to their children. We focus on this more general scenario in elaborating the comparative statics that follow:

Proposition 1 (Parental Transmission of Identity). *Suppose $a \in (\max\{\underline{a}_d, \underline{a}_c\}, \min\{\bar{a}_d, \bar{a}_c\})$, which implies that parental investments in identity transmission are between 0 and 1 for both dissidents and conformists. (1) Investments in the transmission of national identity are decreasing in the perceived longevity of the occupation for dissident parents ($\frac{\partial \delta_d^*}{\partial a} < 0$) and increasing in the perceived longevity of the occupation for conformist parents ($\frac{\partial \delta_c^*}{\partial a} > 0$). (2)(i) Among dissident parents, investments in the transmission of national identity are increasing in the level of discrimination if the perceived longevity of the occupation is sufficiently low and decreasing in discrimination otherwise ($\frac{\partial \delta_d^*}{\partial \tau} > 0$ if and only if $a < a'$). (2)(ii) Among conformist parents, investments in the transmission of national identity are increasing in the level of discrimination if the perceived longevity of the occupation is sufficiently high, and decreasing in discrimination otherwise ($\frac{\partial \delta_c^*}{\partial \tau} > 0$ if and only if $a > a''$).*

Proof. Proof contained in Supplementary Materials. □

The proposition clarifies two important points. First, the perceived longevity of the occupation has a *direct* effect on parental investments in the transmission of national identity, decreasing said investments for dissidents and increasing them for conformists. Second, the perceived longevity of the occupation has an *indirect* effect on the same, as it mediates the impact of discrimination. For the conquering power, imposing discriminatory policies will lead to countervailing parental strategies within the home—dissidents investing more in identity transmission and conformists less—if the solidity of the occupation is in doubt. However, if the perception is that the occupation will be long-lasting, then discrimination will generate parental investment strategies that are compatible with the aims of the nationalizing state, with dissidents tempering their efforts at identity transmission and conformists ramping theirs up. In essence, higher discrimination increases the stakes associated with matching a child’s national identity with that of the ruling power. At the limit, when discrimination is sufficiently great that economic altruism swamps cultural considerations for parents (η_d/Δ and η_c/Δ both approach zero), only one type of parent will invest in transmitting identity in the home: dissidents doing so if the conquering

power is perceived of as more likely than not to be ejected in the subsequent generation ($a < 1/2$) and conformists otherwise ($a > 1/2$).

3.5 Long-Run Cultural Dynamics

The legacy of the occupation can be conceptualized in terms of its influence on the size of the two cultural groups. To characterize the relative sizes of the two groups in the long run, one must elucidate the steady-state dynamics of cultural transmission. Revisiting equation (1), the change in the proportion of dissidents from one time period to the next is equal to:

$$p_{t+1} - p_t = p_t[\delta_d + \phi(\delta_c - \delta_d) - 1] + (1 - \delta_c)\phi, \quad (19)$$

where the quantities ϕ , δ_d , and δ_c are endogenously determined as described above.

In a steady state, $p_{t+1} - p_t = 0$, which implies that the long-run proportion of dissidents is equal to:

$$p^* = \frac{(1 - \delta_c)\phi}{(1 - \delta_c)\phi + (1 - \delta_d)(1 - \phi)}. \quad (20)$$

The numerator of the expression above is the mutation rate from conformists to dissidents. The denominator is the sum of the two mutation rates: the rate from conformists to dissidents and that from dissidents to conformists. Thus, the equilibrium proportion of dissidents in the population depends on the relative magnitude of these two rates (cf. Boyd and Richerson 1985, 61-63). Using this expression, the following proposition describes how changes in the perceived solidity of the occupation and the level of discrimination affect the equilibrium proportion of dissidents.

Proposition 2 (Legacy of Occupation). *(1) The equilibrium proportion of dissidents is decreasing in the perceived longevity of the occupation ($\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial a} < 0$). (2) The impact of discrimination on the long-run proportion of dissidents depends on the perceived longevity of the occupation. If the perceived longevity of the occupation is sufficiently low ($a < a_L$), then an increase in discrimination will increase the proportion of dissidents ($\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \tau} > 0$). On the other hand, if the perceived longevity of the occupation is sufficiently high ($a > a_H$), then an increase in discrimination will decrease the proportion of dissidents ($\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \tau} < 0$).*

Proof. Proof contained in Supplementary Materials. \square

The proposition establishes the central role of perceptions of the solidity of occupation for long-run patterns of national self-identification following territorial conquest. Occupations that are perceived as likely to last into an indefinite future encourage widespread

adoption of the official nationality and abandonment of the marginalized one. In such circumstances, conformist parents are highly motivated to transmit their national identity to their children, as doing so offers both an intrinsic cultural payoff and helps ensure that their children will enjoy the same economic privileges that they do. Dissident parents are pushed in the opposite direction, being disinclined to transmit their identity given its negative consequences for the future economic well-being of their offspring. This conformist-favoring asymmetry in identity transmission in the home is compounded by the fact that labor market discrimination enriches conformists relative to dissidents, which, in turn, generates societal influences on identity formation that also foment the adoption of the official nationality.

Occupations that are perceived to be short-lived generate different dynamics. In this context, it is dissidents who are most motivated to bequeath their identity to their children, since they anticipate that, with the looming ejection of the conquering state, the economic tides will turn in favor of their nationality. Reading the same writing on the wall, conformists become unwilling to shackle their children with a national identity that will soon hinder their life prospects. The existence of conformist-favoring labor market discrimination still creates societal influences in favor of the official nationality, but if the solidity of the occupation is deemed to be sufficiently dubious, these influences will be swamped by group differences in parental efforts to transmit identities in the home.

The proposition also clarifies how discrimination is a double-edged sword, one whose utility for the conquering state is strongly dependent on perceptions of the solidity of the occupation. When solidity is not in question, labor market discrimination does exactly what the conquering state intends: it exacerbates wealth differences between the official and marginalized identities both in the present and in the foreseeable future, making the official nationality simultaneously more attractive at the societal level and for parents contemplating their children's future economic well-being. In the long run, this encourages the growth of the official nationality relative to the marginalized one.

When the solidity of the occupation is in doubt, the impact of discrimination is reversed. Although labor market discrimination continues to exacerbate wealth differences between the official and marginalized identities in the present, it diminishes the future economic prospects of conformist children relative to those of dissidents. As a consequence, dissident parents become strongly motivated to transmit their national identity, whereas conformist parents lose such motivation. At the limit, the dissident-favoring group differences in identity transmission within the home overwhelm the short-run conformist-favoring societal influences, encouraging the long-run growth of the marginalized nationality relative to the official one.

4 State-Directed Nationalization during External Rule: Case Studies


In this section, we test the above model using four cases of occupation that occurred in highly contested nineteenth-century borderlands: Tacna (occupied by Chile from 1880 to 1929) and Northern Schleswig (occupied by Prussia from 1866 to 1920), as well as Tarapacá and Antofagasta (occupied by Chile from the 1880s onward). Across our cases, labor market discrimination (τ) is similarly high, with occupiers adopting a host of formal and informal policies designed to discriminate against adherents of the opposing nationality, thereby elevating the economic status of adherents of the official (state-sponsored) nationality. In this regard, these policies represented official state projects designed to reconfigure the contours of the so-called imagined communities within contested territories (Anderson 1983).

Yet, the predicted longevity of occupation (a) varies across the four cases. The expected length of occupier rule is determined—in the empirical cases we analyze—by two key institutions: plebiscites and treaties. Plebiscites and non-binding treaties provide, to varying degrees, an institutional means to replace an occupier with a government preferred by the dissident group; as such, both institutions raise the probability that the conquering power is removed (lower value of a). Likewise, the absence of these institutions increases the likelihood of an enduring occupation (higher a). A comparison of these cases vividly illustrates how perceptions about the perceived longevity of occupation shape patterns of identity shift and preservation, and, ultimately, the degree to which an occupying state can shape national identities.¹¹

Our primary comparison analyzes the role of plebiscites in Tacna and Northern Schleswig. Both occupations were initiated under the premise that the residents of the conquered territories would ultimately be able to determine the nation-state to which they would belong via a plebiscite. However, the actual and perceived prospect of a plebiscite was very different in the two cases. In the case of Tacna, the plebiscite was a continual and looming possibility (despite repeated delays by the Chilean authorities), due to the treaty upon which the occupation was based and the considerable arbitration efforts of the United States. In the case of Northern Schleswig, by contrast, the prospect of a plebiscite was formally and explicitly jettisoned by occupation authorities shortly after the occupation began, transforming the nature of external rule from occupation to annexation. Percep-

¹¹In selecting our cases, we followed the advice of Lorentzen, Fravel and Paine (2017), who advocate employing case studies that match the underlying assumptions of a formal model and permit one to isolate its key mechanisms.

Figure 1: Theoretical predictions and case studies



tions about the likely longevity of external rule were therefore relatively short in Tacna, which helps explain why the Chilean state-directed nationalization project was ultimately an abject failure. Contrariwise, perceptions of the likely longevity of external rule were relatively long in the case of Schleswig (for the vast majority of the period of external rule), which helps explain why the Prussian state-directed nationalization project had much greater traction.

Our second two cases—Tarapacá and Antofagasta—demonstrate that plebiscites are not the only institutions that can shape perceptions about the longevity of occupation. Even when treaties are perceived to provide a final settlement to territorial disputes, uncertainty can arise around the degree to which these agreements are binding, providing a potential opportunity to renegotiate the terms of occupation. To demonstrate this, we analyze two further cases of Chilean occupation, Tarapacá and Antofagasta. In the former, the treaty that “settled” the dispute was perceived as non-binding, as Chile repeatedly refused to enforce and comply with key provisions of the agreement; as a result, the return of Tarapacá to Peru was viewed as credible, and Chilean efforts to assimilate the Peruvian population were generally unsuccessful. In Antofagasta, a historically Bolivian territory, the treaty ending the territorial conflict was reliably enforced, and Chileanization efforts were more successful. These predictions are outlined in Figure 1 and evaluated in the sections that follow.

4.1 The Tacna plebiscite

The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) between Chile, Peru, and Bolivia reshaped South America’s geography in profound and enduring ways. The victorious side, Chile, acquired Tarapacá, which historically belonged to Peru and possessed some of the most valuable

nitrate deposits on the continent. The Chilean government also obtained the coastal Bolivian department of Litoral, the loss of which rendered Bolivia landlocked (Figure 2).

Notably, however, the agreements to end the War did not provide a final resolution to all outstanding disputes. An 1884 treaty stipulated that the Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica, which Chile had occupied since 1879, would remain under Chilean control for ten years, at which point a plebiscite would be held to determine long-term control over the territory. As we will show in this section, the possibility of this popular referendum on Tacna's fate provided an incentive for Peruvians not only to preserve their national identity but also to transmit it to their children, even in the face of—what they viewed to be—a transitory period of discrimination.

Chile adopted a variety of strategies to encourage or force Peruvians in occupied territories to adopt a Chilean national identity. In the first twenty years of the occupation, these efforts at “Chileanization” were designed to “moderately and slowly transform the patriotic sentiment” through “the creation of new education centers, the founding of new newspapers, and the establishment of an ordered and effective administration to serve the community” (Palacios Rodríguez 1974, 55, author translation). Peruvians reflecting on this period often regarded it as “peaceful,” with efforts at nationalization limited to the resettlement of Chileans in Tacna and Arica and the relocation of key Chilean military posts from Iquique, which was in Tarapacá, to Tacna (Villaran 1926, 699). During these initial years of occupation, Peruvian private schools and newspapers, such as *El Progresista*, operated relatively freely with the “objective of cultivating love of country [Peru]” (Morales Arias 1991, 101, author translation). Hymns honoring Peru were written and sung, and a wealth of patriotic, pro-Peruvian literature was produced and consumed by those living in Tacna.¹²

By the early twentieth century, however, the Chilean government's nationalization efforts had expanded and become more violent. In 1900, the Peruvian legation in Chile wrote a lengthy communique to the Minister of External Relations in Chile, arguing “[The Chilean government] has adopted a series of policies...related to the political and administrative regime of Tacna and Arica, whose Peruvian population, opposed to any change in their nationality, have been induced to alter their wishes concerning their future status” (Peru 1925, 168).

The approach to Chileanization consisted of various formal and informal policies that effectively penalized the maintenance of Peruvian identities. These included an official decree closing Peruvian schools in 1901, followed by the expulsion of Peruvian priests in

¹²See Morales Arias (1991, 98-100); Skuban (2007, 120).

Figure 2: Location of Chilean-occupied territories between 1879-1929 (present-day borders)



Note: Tacna is depicted in black followed by—in gray and from north to south—Arica, Tarapacá, and Antofagasta. The present-day borders of the countries of Peru, Bolivia, and Chile are depicted with Peru to the north (ending with the Tacna border), Bolivia to the east of the occupied territories, and Chile to the south, beginning with Arica. Tacna, Arica, and Tarapacá originally belonged to Peru and Antofagasta to Bolivia. After 1929, all remained under Chilean control except for Tacna, which was returned to Peru.

1907.¹³ Schools were a particularly important tool of Chileanization; Skuban (2007) writes, “[A]ccording to the testimonies of many Peruvians, the Chilean state manipulated these [education] institutions to inculcate a Chilean national character in the next generations of tacneños and ariqueños” (43).¹⁴

Importantly for our theory, Chileanization operated frequently through the denial of employment opportunities to Peruvian sympathizers. The public sector was a primary target. In 1885, six years into the Chilean occupation, Peruvians held more bureaucratic posts than Chileans in Tacna and constituted roughly the same share of teachers. By 1920, however, there were no Peruvian bureaucrats in Tacna and only two teachers.¹⁵ The restriction of key public offices to Chilean loyalists not only served to directly reduce Peruvian influence in Tacna’s administrative affairs but also signaled that those who identified as Peruvian would face severe discrimination in their access to public sector jobs.

Discrimination against Peruvians likewise extended to the private sector. Chilean factories were subsidized, Peruvian labor was boycotted, and young, working-age Peruvian men were often conscripted into the Chilean military or banished from the territory entirely (Villaran 1926, 699). Militant Chilean loyalists organized patriotic leagues (*ligas patrióticas*), which “exercised pressure on local institutions and commercial establishments to dismiss Peruvian employees and replace them with Chileans” (Palacios Rodríguez 1974, 171, author translation). The Leagues also shuttered businesses operated by Peruvian loyalists. Affidavits produced by exiles from Tacna discuss the frequency with which “members of the Patriotic League, composed of soldiers and officers of the Chilean garrison, parade the streets in civilian attire, closing...business establishments belonging to

¹³An editorial from the Chilean newspaper, *El Día*, expressed the fear of the Peruvian clergy and attempted to justify their ouster, writing, “[J]ust as Peruvian priests worked for the Peruvianization of these territories, Chilean priests should work for their Chileanization” Pizarro Pizarro and Díaz Aguad (2017, 209, author translation). To ensure compliance with the ban, the Chilean government in Tacna deployed armed guards to block the entrance to known Peruvian churches (Palacios Rodríguez 1974, 86). In 1885, well over half of the priests in Tacna were Peruvian; by 1920, no Peruvian priests remained in the territory (Appendix Figure A1).

¹⁴The affidavits collected in Peru (1924) vividly show how this manipulation worked in practice. In one case, a middle aged Peruvian father reported that he was told by the police that “as he was the father of eight girls who attended the Tacna Lyceum, a public school, he must become a Chilean citizen in order that his children might continue to derive the advantages of an education in that institution” (Peru 1924, 44). In another, a young Peruvian man reported that the principal of the Tacna public school “compelled [him] by force, as well as other fellow-pupils of the same class, to sign a declaration acknowledging their Chilean nationality” (Peru 1924, 288).

¹⁵One might fear that these statistics reflect an overall reduction in the share of Peruvians living in Tacna, which unquestionably occurred. Crucially, however, we do not observe a decline in Peruvian participation in less prestigious professions, such as cooks and cleaners (See Appendix Figure A1).

Peruvians” (Peru 1924, 175). Such persecution and discrimination was not limited to urban areas; members of the Leagues often traveled to the countryside to attack Peruvian farmhands (Palacios Rodríguez 1974, 171).¹⁶

The success of these efforts to privilege Chilean identities over Peruvian ones was, on balance, low. Some Peruvians were forced to flee, leaving behind property and businesses taken over by Chilean loyalists.¹⁷ Most, however, remained in the occupied territory and, in the face of potential discrimination, maintained their Peruvian identities. They also transmitted these values to their children. The closing of Peruvian schools and newspapers as well as the expulsion of Peruvian clergy increased the importance of the household as a key venue of pro-Peru value transmission. Peruvian parents could no longer expect outside actors to teach their children the importance of Peruvian values.¹⁸ Palacios Rodríguez (1974) writes of the “unbreakable love for the invisible homeland” that emerged in Tacna during this period, one that “became stronger by the day and was transmitted from parents to children, challenging the...reckless policy of Chileanization” (183, author translation). He proceeds to describe the important “work of parents to educate their children, above all else, [about] the care and love for the distant homeland” (Palacios Rodríguez 1974, 190, author translation). A Chilean observer writing in 1922 expressed deep frustration with the “craziness” of Peruvian children maintaining their parents’ identities, writing “There exists [among Tacna youth] a divorce in their ideas. And the reason is clear: their ideas of Peruvianness are based on tradition, on the words they hear from their parents” (Muñoz Figueroa 1922, 151, 170; author translation).¹⁹

Women played an especially important role in maintaining the Peruvian identity during the occupation of Tacna. Palacios Rodríguez (1974) observes the crucial responsibility of mothers in transmitting Peruvian values, “[T]he Peruvian home became the authentic school of patriotism and the mother its tenacious defender” (187). Outside of the home, women were—more broadly—viewed as important vessels for the maintenance of Peruvian identities. As Skuban (2007) observes, “[L]a mujer tacneña [the Tacna woman] has come

¹⁶Importantly, the actions of the Leagues were targeted not only toward Peruvian sympathizers but to any non-Chilean who did not accept Chilean rule. Morales Arias (1991) writes, “Foreigners who did not support Chilean rule would suffer the consequences, putting in danger their own lives” (172, author translation).

¹⁷See e.g., Morales Arias (1991, 170).

¹⁸Peruvians did, however, form and operate clandestine schools to challenge the Chilean formal monopoly over education (Skuban 2007, 42).

¹⁹Chile’s response to this intergenerational transmission was to conscript Peruvian men into the Chilean army. This was expected to—through abuse or indoctrination—induce young Peruvians to support the Chilean cause or otherwise force them to flee the occupied territories to avoid service (Palacios Rodríguez 1974, 126; Peru Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 1925, 51-52).

to symbolize an unwavering defender of Peruvian national identity in the face of attempted chileanization” (129).

Government data from the time attests to women’s embrace of the Peruvian identity in the occupied territories. In 1924, the Chilean government conducted a census in Tacna to analyze preferences in advance of a potential plebiscite. Only 11 percent of young men (under 25) were judged to be pro-Peru, compared with over 40 percent of young women (Figure 3). While the differences are less stark, older women were also more likely to be coded as Peruvian loyalists than older men. These differences may be attributable to several factors, all of which are generally consistent with our argument. Young Peruvian men may have been less likely to vocally express their pro-Peru sentiment to a government census-taker for fear of labor market discrimination, expulsion, abuse, or military conscription, all of which were less directly salient for women. Relatedly, men who were publicly supportive of Peru may have been forced into exile before 1924, reducing their share of the male population residing in Tacna when the census was taken.²⁰


Importantly, the census data also show that Chilean efforts to force assimilation and conformism were generally unsuccessful. Outside of the young cohort of men, who were most vulnerable to labor market discrimination and other forms of harmful targeting, support for Peru was relatively high across age and gender groups. 35 percent of all those censused supported Peru, and a further 23 percent could be reliably linked to neither country, meaning that well under half of Tacna’s adult population could be considered pro-Chile.²¹ This presented a key issue for the occupying government, which had long promised a plebiscite to decide Tacna’s fate. As an observer for the Peruvian newspaper *El Comercio* recorded in 1925 “In Tacna, Peru lives in a religious patriotism that has overwhelming force. . . [T]he Chileans have not been able to achieve much in Tacna” (Cavagnaro Orellana 1986, 183). The Peruvian defiance of Chileanization efforts can be seen perhaps most clearly in the 1901 *procesión de la bandera* (procession of the flag) in which the Peruvian flag was marched openly through the streets of Tacna, leading Chilean authorities in the territory to observe the “‘love and loyalty’ to Peru among many in Tacna and Arica” (Skuban 2007, 58).²²

²⁰If this were true, we might expect there to be more women in the census than men. This is not what we observe. There are twice as many men under 25 as women. This does not disprove a massive exodus of Peruvian men, however, as many Chilean young laborers were imported to Tacna and Arica between 1910 and 1925.

²¹These numbers mark a stark contrast to formal government records of individual nationalities in Tacna. The 1920 Census found that only 15 percent of Tacna residents were Peruvian while nearly 80 percent were Chilean.

²²The procession has since become an annual event to commemorate the end of Chilean occupation.

Figure 3: Patriotic sentiments by gender/age (Tacna, 1924)



Note: Data were taken from the 1924 Chilean census of Tacna. Respondent sentiments were coded by enumerators: pro-Chile, pro-Peru, or *dudoso* (unknown).

The promise of an eventual plebiscite encouraged this preservation of Peruvian identities, largely through the intergenerational transmission mechanisms revealed in our theoretical model. While the plebiscite was not held in 1894, as originally stipulated in the 1884 treaty, there was a commonly held belief in the ensuing years that a referendum to determine Tacna's status was imminent. This belief was bolstered by the designation of the United States as an arbitrator between Peru and Chile (Borchard 1922). The US took seriously this role, designating renowned general John G. Pershing to be chair of the Tacna-Arica Plebiscitary Commission.²³ The influence of a powerful third-party actor that could credibly enforce the terms of the 1884 treaty reinforced the notion that a plebiscite would be held.

The belief that occupation would be short-lived not only discouraged more widespread out-migration of Peruvian loyalists but also reduced the cost to parents of transmitting

²³Pershing was commander of US forces during World War 1, and to date, holds the distinction of being the only living person to hold the title of General of the Armies. After a brief tenure as Chair of the Commission, he was replaced by another famed general, William Lassiter.

Peruvian values to their children. If Tacna and Peru were reunited, the cost of value transmission in the context of Chileanization (i.e. discrimination) would have been incurred either only for a short time or not at all. As such, many parents decided to transmit their Peruvian identities and loyalties to their children, and Chilean efforts to discriminate against Peruvians simply transferred the transmission of dissident values from the public sphere to the private one, an arguably more effective venue for the preservation of Peruvian national identity.

The next section evaluates the case of Northern Schleswig, which was occupied during a similar historical moment to Tacna. A plebiscite was also promised through an 1866 treaty, but, unlike Tacna, the possibility of such a referendum was discarded within the first two decades of occupation. Consistent with our theory, we demonstrate that state-directed nationalization projects subsequently adopted by the Prussians were generally more successful than similar ones undertaken by the Chilean government in Tacna. Ultimately, Danes in Northern Schleswig, facing a potentially long period of Prussian rule, frequently adopted a German identity.


4.2 The (short-lived) Schleswig plebiscite

Beginning in the mid-fifteenth century, the region of Schleswig-Holstein, through mutual agreement with the Danish King Christian, operated as a relatively autonomous region within the Kingdom of Denmark (Dicey 1864, 4-5). This state of affairs continued until 1848, when a revolution installed a group known as the Eider Danes in power in Copenhagen; a chief demand of this newly installed group was to separate the Danish Schleswig from the German Holstein and incorporate the former more fully into Denmark (Prange 1864, 7). The leaders of Schleswig-Holstein strongly contested this decision, and Prussia leaped into the fray to “defend” the autonomy of the region, a move that ignited the first and second Schleswig wars. The conflict was not resolved until the Treaty of Vienna in 1864, which left all of Schleswig-Holstein under Prussian control.²⁴ The Prussian occupation that followed was particularly transformative for the northern regions of Schleswig (Figure 4), where the majority of the Danish-speaking population resided (Prior 1914, 4-5).

Northern Schleswig and Tacna exhibit certain important similarities. Both were occupied following a protracted conflict between neighboring countries at a similar moment in history, when issues of national self-determination were becoming increasingly salient.

²⁴The full story of the conflict was certainly much more complex; as British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston famously argued, “The Schleswig-Holstein question is so complicated, only three men in Europe have ever understood it” (Hall 2006, 441).

Figure 4: Location of Prussian-occupied Schleswig-Holstein (present-day borders)



Note: Northern Schleswig is depicted in black followed by—in gray—the other portions of Schleswig and all of Holstein. The present-day borders of the countries of Denmark and Germany are shown, with Denmark to the north (ending with border of Northern Schleswig), and Germany to the south. All of the shaded territory was under Prussian control between 1866 and 1920. After 1920, all remained under German control except for Northern Schleswig, which joined Denmark.

As Chile had done in Tacna, Prussian occupiers promised a plebiscite to determine the long-term fate of Northern Schleswig; Article 5 of the Treaty of Prague in 1866 stipulated that “the northern districts of Sleswick should be ceded to Denmark, when it expressed the desire of a union with Denmark by means of a free vote” (Prior 1914, 6). As was the case in Tacna—where the United States acted as an arbiter—France and Austria had incentives to ensure compliance with the plebiscite. Prussia had included Article 5 at the insistence of France’s Napoleon III and to appease Austria, which feared Prussia’s expansionism into Schleswig-Holstein (Eckhardt 1919, 51). Consistent with our theory, during the period in which a plebiscite was thought imminent, Danish identity was widely asserted through a “protest policy;” Danish residents “[considered] Prussian rule a short-term affair...[and] advocated a hard line against the government” (Thaler 2009, 73).

Yet, unlike Tacna, the promise of a referendum to decide Northern Schleswig's future was short-lived. Third-party enforcement of the 1866 Treaty lasted just over a decade: Prussia defeated Napoleon III and France in 1870-1871 and allied with Austria through an 1878 treaty that nullified Article 5 (Archer and Joenniemi 2017, 140; Eckhardt 1919, 52). The abrogation of this provision officially changed the occupation to an annexation, solidifying the prospects of enduring Prussian rule of all Schleswig-Holstein.

The cancellation of the plebiscite coincided with an intensification of Prussia's efforts to Germanize the Danish population of Northern Schleswig. As was the case with Chile in Tacna, the Prussian occupation of Northern Schleswig was—at the outset—"comparatively mild" (Prior 1914, 6). However, it was followed by an intense period of assimilation in which Danish schools, newspapers, and cultural events were banned (Archer and Joenniemi 2017, 140). Danish priests were expelled, young Danish men were conscripted into the Prussian military, and some Danish loyalists were banished from the territory altogether (Prior 1914, 13).²⁵

One of the key ways that the Prussian government pursued its assimilationist goals was through economic discrimination. Eckhardt (1919) observes, "For some decades the Prussian government tried to force the Danish farmers to emigrate and have their farms taken up by loyal Prussians...Any Dane that does anything unfriendly to the Prussian government is banished. This often means the loss of good positions, business and property interests" (54-55). Prior (1914) likewise observes that, "Danish farm-hands were expelled, as a means of putting pressure upon their employers, or were ordered to seek employment with 'loyal' farmers" (12). Benefits were similarly allocated along ethno-national lines. The Prussian government bought up valuable agricultural land, which it leased only to "German-oriented" farmers (Schultz Hansen 2022, 29). These attempts to Germanize the population had mixed effects. In some areas and among certain sectors of the population, they served to revitalize the Danish national identity (Eckhardt 1919, 56). Yet, this response was far from uniform.

For many Danes, assimilation policies encouraged the adoption of German identities. A large contingent were "drawn into the German cultural sphere through higher education or professional advancement" (Thaler 2009, 81). Danish-speaking farmers found that learning German facilitated agricultural trade, while transmitting the language increased the employment and marriage prospects of their sons and daughters (Thaler 2009, 61-

²⁵The local newspaper predicted that these efforts would generate a backlash: "The oppression of the Danish nationality in North Sleswick...would have the necessary result of causing the North Sleswickers to turn their gaze continually towards the north...and would maintain their friendly feeling towards Denmark" (Prior 1914, 6). In some ways, these predictions were borne out; Danes in the region formed defense organizations to defend their cultural practices and language (Thaler 2009, 76-77).

62, 81). Other native Danish speakers did not adopt only the German language but also a German national identity. Those who did were labeled *hjemmetyskere*, or “Home Germans” (Thaler 2009, 82).

The rise of German identification corresponds to both the intensification of Prussian economic discrimination against Danes, and especially, the revocation of the proposed plebiscite. This can be seen in support for German electoral candidates. During much of the period of occupation, residents of Northern Schleswig—whether Danish or German—had the right to vote in elections for Imperial Germany’s national parliament (*Reichstag*). Initially, German candidates received little support in Northern Schleswig, obtaining around 15 percent of the vote. However, after 1878—when the plebiscite was formally repealed—support for German candidates rose sharply: to 20 percent in 1884, 25 percent in 1898, and 30 percent in 1912 (Schultz Hansen 2022, 28). A possible concern with these data is that Prussian elections, particularly in the 1890s, were characterized by electoral irregularities (Mares 2015, 97-99).²⁶ As such, increased support for German candidates could be linked to either a suppression of Danish votes or successful Germanization policies.

A perhaps more robust indicator of successful German nationalization can be observed in changing patterns of civil society mobilization during the period of occupation. The Home Germans established the Northern Schleswig German Association in 1890, which promoted pro-German newspapers, hosted German-themed cultural events, and sponsored an annual outdoor festival celebrating the legacy of Otto von Bismarck (Berdichevsky 2002, 55-56; Schultz Hansen 2022, 35-37). Membership in the organization expanded rapidly in subsequent decades, growing from around 1,200 in 1891 to over 7,000 members in 1914 (Schultz Hansen 2003, 199).

Our theory would predict that the adoption of German identities should be strongest in urban areas, where the economic advantage of learning German—and the cost of maintaining a Danish identity—were highest (Thaler 2009, 61). This prediction is borne out in the data. Support for German parliamentary candidates was especially strong in the region’s largest cities, including Tønder, Aabenraa, Haderslev, and Sønderborg, where large majorities voted for German candidates—over Danish or Social Democratic ones.²⁷ Residents of these cities were also most likely to vote for the German position in the

²⁶Mares (2015) observes that electoral fraud occurred in Schleswig-Holstein during the 1890s (58-59).

²⁷See Schultz Hansen (2022, 28).

1920 plebiscite, which ultimately returned Northern Schleswig to Denmark.²⁸ At least half of the voters of Tønder, Aabenraa, and Sønderborg supported remaining in Germany (Gesme 2022, 60). Importantly, these numbers cannot be solely attributed to migration from Germany or from German-aligned Holstein and Central Schleswig; estimates suggest that—at most—one-quarter of voters in urban areas were migrants (Schultz Hansen 2022, 30).

Thus, consistent with our theoretical predictions, the institutions associated with Prussian occupation appear to have shaped whether identities persisted or were replaced. During the period when a plebiscite seemed imminent—from 1866 to 1878—Danish residents of Northern Schleswig invested in preserving their identity. The termination of the proposed plebiscite, coupled with increased economic discrimination, sparked a notable shift in these dynamics. Danish residents were more likely to embrace a German identity—and transmit it to their children—believing that Prussian rule would be enduring.

The period following the return of Northern Schleswig to Denmark likewise provides support for our theoretical model. A resumption of Danish rule led to a notable reemergence of Danish identity; Thaler (2009) observes, “With the departure of German civil servants after World War I, at the latest, most rural communities of northern Sleswig became monolingually Danish again” (61). A strong German minority also persisted in the region; the pro-German Sleswig Party maintained a solid electoral base, obtaining around 15 percent of the vote in every parliamentary election in Northern Schleswig between 1920 and 1939 (Thaler 2009, 83). In this case, German identities persisted, even in the face of enduring Danish rule due largely to the policy approach of the Danish government. Rather than pursuing discrimination and assimilation, officials in Copenhagen generally opted for a strategy of accommodating the German minority in Northern Schleswig.²⁹ The German minority could thus preserve their identity without facing economic repercussions for themselves or their children.

4.3 Beyond Plebisicties: Binding and Non-Binding Treaties in Tarapacá and Antofagasta

Plebiscites are not the only institution that can generate a backfire effect against occupiers’ assimilationist goals. Whether treaties that give rise to occupation are perceived as binding may also shape the preservation of the dissident national identity. Once again, the Chilean

²⁸The plebiscite arose as part of the Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I and thus was not broadly anticipated by the residents of Schleswig; ultimately, Northern Schleswig returned to Denmark while the rest of the occupied territory remained with Germany (Gesme 2022).

²⁹See Thaler (2009, 83-84).

occupation of Peru proves instructive. The fate of the Peruvian province of Tarapacá, unlike Tacna and Arica, appeared to be definitively settled through the Treaty of Ancón (1883). According to the agreement, Chile would take full possession of the region with no plebiscite or other mechanism to return the territory to Peru. However, the failure of Chile to comply with its obligations to hold a plebiscite in Tacna and Arica by 1894 created an opening to contest other elements of the Treaty. González Miranda (2004) writes, “The non-compliance with the plebiscite of 1894 led the Peruvian Republic to challenge the entire treaty and thus to seek the reintegration of Tarapacá. From that moment, it was regarded, like Arica and Tacna, as a ‘captive’ province” (27, author translation). This provided an opening to the Peruvian government, which embarked on a campaign to “ideologically pressure the Tarapacan population to preserve its Peruvian identity, with the hope that Tarapacá would be reintegrated into the country’s borders. This impeded the Tarapacans of Peruvian origin from assimilating to the new nationality...through mixed marriage [and] the birth of Chilean children and grandchildren” (González Miranda 2004, 27, author translation). Once again, the prospect of near-term reintegration into their former “homeland” encouraged Peruvians in an occupied territory to maintain their identities, especially within the private sphere.

Where such treaties are instead binding, we would expect occupying powers’ nationalization efforts to be more successful. Chile’s treaty with Bolivia to conclude the War of the Pacific presented such a binding agreement, ceding Antofagasta (formerly the Bolivian province of Litoral) to Chile in perpetuity. Unlike the Treaty of Ancón, there have been no meaningful deviations from the agreement, despite its legitimacy being rhetorically challenged by Bolivian politicians—even today. Thus, there neither exists nor existed a credible path of return for Antofagasta to Bolivia. Consistent with our theory, the more settled status of Antofagasta resulted in less resistance to Chileanization programs than that which emerged in Tarapacá (González Pizarro 2012).

It is important to note that the differences in reactions to Chileanization in Antofagasta and Tarapacá cannot be immediately attributed to factors other than the expected duration of occupation. Both regions were very rich in nitrates and were sparsely settled, factors that could otherwise drive Chile’s desire or ability to assimilate those living in the occupied territories (González Miranda 1999; Ortega 1984). Furthermore, the top-down efforts of Peru to encourage resistance to Chileanization in Tarapacá do not explain the differences in patterns of resistance to assimilation: the Peruvian and Bolivian governments both vocally challenged the legitimacy of Chile’s claims to the occupied territories. Finally, differences in the propensity for nationalist mobilization in the occupied territories do not explain patterns of resistance to Chileanization: Peru did not have a more consol-

idated or well-developed national identity than Bolivia did at the end of the nineteenth century (Larson 2004).

5 Conclusion

Since the end of the age of empires, and in numerous cases before, the territorial expansion of states has been joined with nation-building efforts. This state of affairs reflects the widespread internalization of the norm of self-rule, the notion that the ruled have the right to expect that their rulers belong to the same “people” that they do. While global acceptance of this norm does not necessarily constrain states’ initial war making behavior, it does shape how they behave once territorial gains have been achieved. Cementing territorial gains acquired in war is more likely in the modern states system if the inhabitants of a conquered territory come to see themselves as belonging to the same nation as their conqueror. For this reason, state-directed nationalization efforts have long been part of the conqueror’s toolkit. They will remain so for as long as national self-identification determines whether individuals will acquiesce to taxation, defend state boundaries, or take up arms against their rulers.

This paper has sought to elucidate why the policies implemented as part of state-directed nationalization efforts ultimately succeed or fail. Our focus was on labor market discrimination, as conquering states commonly utilize this instrument to encourage the adoption of the nationality that they represent. We show that the efficacy of discrimination hinges on perceptions of the irreversibility of the conquest itself. If conquering states introduce institutions—such as sovereignty plebiscites—that create the perception that the official and marginalized identities may at some point have their roles reversed, then assimilation will be difficult to incentivize. Instead of facilitating the absorption of new territory, employing discrimination in such a context will only make matters worse. Our paper formalizes these ideas using a game-theoretic model of cultural change across generations, the key components of which it illustrates using the Chilean occupation of Tacna (southern Peru), the Prussian occupation of Northern Schleswig (southern Denmark), as well as the regions of Tarapacá and Antofagasta (northern Chile).

What broad lessons emerge from our study? Our analysis paints a picture of the types of states that are best suited to expanding their nations via territorial conquest. Such states share three traits in common. First, they adhere to a relatively flexible vision of the nation itself. This makes it possible for holders of the conquered nationality to adopt the conqueror’s nationality at reasonable cost. States which envision themselves as the representatives of primordial nations—based in race, religion, or both—are at a

disadvantage in this respect, in that, barring genocide or ethnic cleansing, they can only plausibly expand their nations to territories where the populace shares these features. Second, successful nation expanders enjoy overwhelming superiority of military force vis-à-vis conquered territories. The use of such force is directed narrowly at the territories to be absorbed, as nation expanders must avoid broader regional or global conflicts that could degrade their military capacities. Finally, successful nation expanders are implacable and unambiguous with respect to the future of the newly acquired territories; permanent annexation is treated as the new reality shortly after conquest takes place.

In sum, conquering powers simply cannot have it all. They cannot attempt to enjoy international legitimacy by promising a sovereignty plebiscite to their occupied territories, while, at the same time, using discrimination to prod the denizens of those territories to adopt their nationality. Such a halfway house strategy is almost certainly doomed to fail.

References

- Aaskoven, Lasse. 2022. “Foreign Occupation and Support for International Cooperation: Evidence from Denmark.” *World Politics* 74(2):285–325.
- Aghion, Philippe, Xavier Jaravel, Torsten Persson and Dorothée Rouzet. 2019. “Education and Military Rivalry.” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 17(2):376–412.
- Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. (Benedict Richard O’Gorman). 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso Editions/NLB.
- Ansell, Ben and Johannes Lindvall. 2013. “The Political Origins of Primary Education Systems: Ideology, Institutions, and Interdenominational Conflict in an Era of Nation-Building.” *American Political Science Review* 107(3):505–522.
- Archer, Clive and Pertti Joenniemi. 2017. *The Nordic Peace*. Routledge.
- Balcells, Laia. 2012. “The Consequences of Victimization on Political Identities: Evidence from Spain.” *Politics & Society* 40(3):311–347.
- Berdichevsky, Norman. 2002. *The Danish-German Border Dispute, 1815-2001: Aspects of Cultural and Demographic Politics*. Bethesda, MD: Academica Press.
- Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson. 2019. “Democratic Values and Institutions.” *American Economic Review: Insights* 1(1):59–76.
- Bisin, Alberto, Eleonora Patacchini, Thierry Verdier and Yves Zenou. 2011. “Formation and Persistence of Oppositional Identities.” *European Economic Review* 55(8):1046–1071.
- Bisin, Alberto, Jean-Paul Carvalho and Thierry Verdier. 2023. Cultural Transmission and Religion. In *The Economics of Religion*, ed. Robert Sauer. Singapore: World Scientific pp. 1–62.
- Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier. 2001. “The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences.” *Journal of Economic Theory* 97(2):298–319.
- Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier. 2023. “Advances in the Economic Theory of Cultural Transmission.” *Annual Review of Economics* 15(1):63–89.
- Borchard, Edwin M. 1922. “The Tacna-Arica Controversy.” *Foreign Affairs* 1(1):29–48.
- Boyd, Robert and Peter J. Richerson. 1985. *Culture and the Evolutionary Process*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1995. “National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe.” *Daedalus* 124(2):107–132.

- Cavagnaro Orellana, Luis. 1986. *Materiales para la Historia de Tacna: Cautiverio, Campaña pre Plebiscitaria (1925-1927)*. Vol. 25 Tacna: Cooperativa San Pedro de Tacna, Fondo de Desarrollo Cultural.
- Cavalli-Sforza, Luigi Luca and Marcus W. Feldman. 1981. *Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer and Brian Min. 2010. "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis." *World Politics* 62(1):87–119.
- Darden, Keith and Harris Mylonas. 2016. "Threats to Territorial Integrity, National Mass Schooling, and Linguistic Commonality." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(11):1446–1479.
- De Juan, Alexander, Felix Haass, Carlo Koos, Sascha Riaz and Thomas Tichelbaecker. 2024. "War and Nationalism: How WW1 battle deaths fueled civilians' support for the Nazi Party." *American Political Science Review* 118(1):144–162.
- Dicey, Edward. 1864. *The Schleswig-Holstein War*. Tinsley Brothers.
- Downes, Alexander B. 2021. *Catastrophic Success: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Goes Wrong*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Eckhardt, C. C. 1919. "The North Slesvig or Dano-German Question." *The Scientific Monthly* 8(1):49–57.
- Edelstein, David M. 2011. *Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Fouka, Vasiliki. 2020. "Backlash: The Unintended Effects of Language Prohibition in U.S. Schools after World War I." *The Review of Economic Studies* 87(1):204–239.
- Gesme, Ryan J. 2022. To Remain a Schleswiger: The Construction of Communal Identities in the Era of the Great War. In *Like Snow in the Sun?: The German Minority in Denmark in Historical Perspective*. Berlin: De Gruyter pp. 47–66.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and change in world politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- González Miranda, Sergio. 2004. *El Dios Cautivo*. Santiago, Chile: LOM Ediciones.
- González Miranda, Sergio A. 1999. "De La Solidaridad a La Xenofobia: Tarapacá, Chile, 1907-1911." *Estudios Sociológicos* 17(51):837–855.
- González Pizarro, José Antonio. 2012. "El Vicario Luis Silva Lezaeta y El Proceso de "Chilenización" En El Norte Grande: Las Experiencias de Antofagasta y Tarapacá. 1882-1897." *Tiempo histórico* (5):55–69.
- Gruffydd-Jones, Jamie. 2017. "Dangerous days: The impact of nationalism on interstate conflict." *Security Studies* 26(4):698–728.

- Hall, Peter A. 2006. Danish Capitalism in Comparative Perspective. In *National Identity and the Varieties of Capitalism: The Danish Experience*, ed. John L. Campbell, John A. Hall and Ove Pedersen. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP pp. 441–452.
- Kalin, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis. 2018. "How to Think About Social Identity." *Annual Review of Political Science* 21(1):239–257.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2008. "Ethnic Defection in Civil War." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(8):1043–1068.
- Knappe, Austin J. 2023. "The Civilians' Dilemma: How Religious and Ethnic Minorities Survived the Islamic State Occupation of Northern Iraq." *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 14(1):37–67.
- Kocher, Matthew Adam, Adria K. Lawrence and Nuno P. Monteiro. 2018. "Nationalism, Collaboration, and Resistance: France under Nazi Occupation." *International Security* 43(2):117–150.
- Laitin, David D. 1995. "Marginality: A Microperspective." *Rationality and Society* 7(1):31–57.
- Laitin, David D. 1998. *Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Laitin, David D. 2007. *Nations, States, and Violence*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Larson, Brooke. 2004. *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lawrence, Adria. 2013. *Imperial Rule and the Politics of Nationalism: Anti-Colonial Protest in the French Empire*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Liberman, Peter. 1998. *Does conquest pay? The exploitation of occupied industrial societies*. Princeton University Press.
- Lorentzen, Peter, M Taylor Fravel and Jack Paine. 2017. "Qualitative investigation of theoretical models: The value of process tracing." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 29(3):467–491.
- Mares, Isabela. 2015. *From Open Secrets to Secret Voting: Democratic Electoral Reforms and Voter Autonomy*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Morales Arias, Carlos E. 1991. *El Calvario de Tacna (1879-1929)*. Lima: Alfa.
- Muñoz Figueroa, Alberto. 1922. *Recuerdos de Tacna y Arica*. Santiago, Chile: Impr. Fiscal de la Penitenciaría.

- Mylonas, Harris. 2013. *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities*. Problems of International Politics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mylonas, Harris and Maya Tudor. 2021. "Nationalism: What We Know and What We Still Need to Know." *Annual Review of Political Science* 24(1):109–132.
- Nunn, Nathan. 2021. History as Evolution. In *The Handbook of Historical Economics*, ed. Alberto Bisin and Giovanni Federico. Cambridge, Mass: Academic Press pp. 41–91.
- Ortega, Luis. 1984. "Nitrates, Chilean Entrepreneurs and the Origins of the War of the Pacific." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 16(2):337–380.
- Paglayan, Agustina S. 2022. "Education or Indoctrination? The Violent Origins of Public School Systems in an Era of State-Building." *American Political Science Review* 116(4):1242–1257.
- Palacios Rodríguez, Raúl. 1974. *La Chilenización de Tacna y Arica, 1883-1929*. Lima: Editorial Arica.
- Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2021. Culture, Institutions, and Policy. In *The Handbook of Historical Economics*, ed. Alberto Bisin and Giovanni Federico. Cambridge, Mass: Academic Press pp. 463–489.
- Peru. 1924. *Arbitration Between Peru and Chile: Appendix to the Counter Case of Peru in the Matter of the Controversy Arising Out of the Question of the Pacific Before the President of the United States of America, Arbitrator : Under the Protocol and Supplementary Act Between the Republic of Peru and the Republic of Chile, Signed July 20, 1922, at Washington, D.C., Ratified January 15, 1923*. National Capital Press, Incorporated.
- Peru. 1925. *Arbitraje entre el Perú y Chile: Alegato del Perú, presentado al arbitro, el presidente de los Estados Unidos sobre la cuestión del Pacífico, conforme al protocolo y acta complementaria, firmados entre la república del Perú y la república de Chile, el 20 de julio de 1922, en Wáshington, D. C., y ratificados el 15 de enero de 1923*. Lima: T. Scheuch.
- Peru Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. 1925. *Documentos oficiales relativos al problema de Tacna y Arica*. Lima: Talleres tipográficos de la Prensa.
- Pizarro Pizarro, Elías and Alfonso Díaz Aguad. 2017. El reloj del tiempo marcaba cien años: Arica y Tacna en las fiestas del Centenario. In *Tránsitos Historiográficos: Arica y su Hinterland (Siglos XVI-XX)*, ed. Elías Pizarro Pizarro. 1 ed. Arica, Chile: Ediciones Universidad de Tarapacá pp. 205–214.
- Prange, Francis. 1864. *Germany Versus Denmark: Being a Short Account of the Schleswig-Holstein Question*. Liverpool: "Daily Post" Steam Printing Works.

- Prior, W. H. 1914. *North Sleswick Under Prussian Rule, 1864-1914*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Readman, P., C. Radding and C. Bryant. 2014. *Borderlands in World History, 1700-1914*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. *The rise of the trading state: Commerce and conquest in the modern world*. Basic Books.
- Saideman, Stephen and R. William Ayres. 2008. *For Kin or Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism, and War*. Columbia University Press.
- Sambanis, Nicholas, Stergios Skaperdas and William C. Wohlforth. 2015. "Nation-Building through War." *American Political Science Review* 109(2):279–296.
- Schrock-Jacobson, Gretchen. 2012. "The Violent Consequences of the Nation: Nationalism and the Initiation of Interstate War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(5):825–852.
- Schultz Hansen, Hans. 2003. For Kejser og rige. Den nye hjemmetyskhed 1871-1914. In *Grænselandshistorie gennem 40 år: Studieafdelningen ved Dansk Centralbibliotek for Sydslesvig 1963-2003*, ed. Lars N. Henningsen. Studieafdelingens udgivelser Flensborg: Studieafdelningen ved Dansk Centralbibliotek for Sydslesvig pp. 165–232.
- Schultz Hansen, Hans. 2022. A Community Takes Shape: Germans in North Schleswig between the 1840s and 1914. In *Like Snow in the Sun?: The German Minority in Denmark in Historical Perspective*, ed. Peter Thaler. Berlin: De Gruyter pp. 11–46.
- Skuban, William E. 2007. *Lines in the Sand: Nationalism and Identity on the Peruvian-Chilean Frontier*. Albuquerque: UNM Press.
- Snyder, Jack. 2000. *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. W. W. Norton.
- Thaler, Peter. 2009. *Of Mind and Matter: The Duality of National Identity in the German-Danish Borderlands*. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press.
- Ticchi, Davide, Thierry Verdier and Andrea Vindigni. 2013. "Democracy, Dictatorship and the Cultural Transmission of Political Values."
- Villaran, Manuel V. 1926. "Chile's Policy of Aggression and Intimidation." *Current History (1916-1940)* 24(5):697–704.
- Wilson, Thomas M. and Hastings Donnan. 1998. *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Wimmer, Andreas. 2013. *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*. Cambridge University Press.

Supplementary Materials: National Identity after Conquest

A1 Proofs of propositions

Proof of proposition 1. For part (1), we have $\frac{\partial \delta_d^*}{\partial a} = -2(1-\phi)\Delta < 0$ and $\frac{\partial \delta_c^*}{\partial a} = 2\phi\Delta > 0$. For (2)(i), we have:

$$\frac{\partial \delta_d^*}{\partial \tau} = -\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial \tau} [\eta_d + \Delta(1-2a)] + \frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial \tau} (1-2a)(1-\phi), \quad (1)$$

which is positive if and only if:

$$a < a' \equiv \frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \frac{\eta_d}{\frac{1-\phi}{\beta} + \Delta} \right). \quad (2)$$

Finally, for (2)(ii), we have:

$$\frac{\partial \delta_c^*}{\partial \tau} = \frac{\partial \phi}{\partial \tau} [\eta_c - \Delta(1-2a)] - \frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial \tau} (1-2a)\phi, \quad (3)$$

which is positive if and only if:

$$a > a'' \equiv \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{\eta_c}{\Delta - \frac{\phi}{\beta}} \right). \quad (4)$$

Proof of proposition 2. Let $\theta_d \equiv (1 - \delta_c)\phi$ be the mutation rate from conformists to dissidents and $\theta_c \equiv (1 - \delta_d)(1 - \phi)$ be the mutation rate from dissidents to conformists. Differentiating p^* with respect to an arbitrary parameter α gives:

$$\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{\frac{\partial \theta_d}{\partial \alpha} \theta_c - \frac{\partial \theta_c}{\partial \alpha} \theta_d}{(\theta_d + \theta_c)^2}. \quad (5)$$

For (1), consider the effects of an increase in a . Differentiating the mutation rates gives:

$$\frac{\partial \theta_d}{\partial a} = -\frac{\partial \delta_c}{\partial a} \phi < 0 \quad (6)$$

$$\frac{\partial \theta_c}{\partial a} = -\frac{\partial \delta_d}{\partial a} (1 - \phi) > 0, \quad (7)$$

which, given equation (5), implies that $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial a} < 0$.

For (2), differentiation of the mutation rates gives:

$$\frac{\partial \theta_d}{\partial \tau} = -\frac{\partial \delta_c}{\partial \tau} \phi + \frac{\partial \phi}{\partial \tau} (1 - \delta_c) \leq 0 \quad (8)$$

$$\frac{\partial \theta_c}{\partial \tau} = -\frac{\partial \delta_d}{\partial \tau} (1 - \phi) - \frac{\partial \phi}{\partial \tau} (1 - \delta_d) \leq 0. \quad (9)$$


Plugging (8) and (9) into (5) and rearranging, one has that $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \tau} > 0$ if and only if the following inequality is satisfied:

$$-\frac{\partial \delta_c}{\partial \tau} \left(\frac{1 - \delta_d}{1 - \delta_c} \right) + \frac{\partial \delta_d}{\partial \tau} \left(\frac{1 - \delta_c}{1 - \delta_d} \right) > -\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial \tau} \left(\frac{1}{\phi(1 - \phi)} \right). \quad (10)$$

The quantity on the RHS of (10) is a positive constant, whereas the quantity on the LHS depends on a for both its sign and magnitude. According to Proposition 1, $\partial \delta_d / \partial \tau > 0$ and $\partial \delta_c / \partial \tau < 0$ if a is sufficiently small ($a < a'' < a'$). This ensures that both quantities in the sum on the LHS of (10) are positive. Moreover, as a approaches $\min\{\underline{a}_d, \underline{a}_c\}$, δ_d approaches 1 and δ_c approaches 0, leading the LHS of (10) to approach positive infinity, thereby guaranteeing that there is a threshold value of a , a_L , such that the inequality holds if $a < a_L$. By the same token, Proposition 1 holds that $\partial \delta_d / \partial \tau < 0$ and $\partial \delta_c / \partial \tau > 0$ if a is sufficiently large ($a > a' > a''$). This ensures that both quantities in the sum on the LHS of (10) are negative, implying that there is a threshold value of a , a_H , such that the inequality fails to hold if $a > a_H$.

A2 Figures

Figure A1: Peruvian professions in Tacna, 1885-1920



Note: Data taken from the 1885 and 1920 General Chilean Censuses.